The 2003 agreement remains applicable for accidents that occurred on 14 February 2003 or after 1 March 2017. Of course, Parliament could pass legislation that explicitly regulates the Mib. However, the impact of these effects on current agreements is uncertain. If, for example, Parliament commits to pursuing the current mib agreements and adding legislation governing the Mib, this could create confusion and conflict for victims. In addition, it could be a lack of support from the insurance industry and the possible removal of flexibility and expertise. Nevertheless, transparency and enforcement could be enhanced, which will lead us to the next part of this article. Roadpeace v Secretary of State for Transport gegen Motor Insurer`s Bureau  ewhc 2725 (admin). The Tribunal referred to Mr Evans/Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions 2006] ewhc 322 (QB) (where the court found a violation of EU legislation with regard to deadlines). The High Court stated : “Evans does not suggest that there is no difference between the rules applicable to insured and identified drivers and unidentified drivers.” The Tribunal also found that the principle of equivalence was not offended by the differences and stated: “Equivalence does not require that the provisions be identical; They are equally supportive of the different circumstances to which they must apply. However, this clause does not apply when the MIB applies to an arbitrator the approval of an arbitration award in accordance with paragraph 14 (and references to arbitration in paragraph 21 are to be read accordingly).
The mib`s relationship with its members is found in its statutes.31 An interesting aspect of the Mib`s statutes is Article 75. This provides that the insurer compensates the victim as an agent for the mib if a claim is made against the mib and if the driver has insurance (although invalid). Compensation is awarded in the context of uda 2015, not the original insurance policy. The UK legislation under rta 1988 allows this by not removing any restrictions on coverage. For example, section 148, paragraph 2 rta, 1988 limits certain exclusion clauses, which means that insurers may apply exclusions other than those provided for in section 148, paragraph 2 rta, 1988. This sounds reasonable, but it is controversial, given that the insurer should, under EU law, compensate the third party, and it should be within the framework of the insurance policy and not under the mib agreement. Cjeu`s cases such as Csonka 32 have established that compensation should only be awarded under the compensation scheme “in the absence of an insurance policy.” However, the case law in the United Kingdom has not followed.33 The usefulness of an insurer using an exclusion clause is unclear, since it would likely have to pay under section 75.34, but this underscores a complex relationship between insurers, mib and law. Insurers, which are part of the governance of the mib, provide benefits by leveraging the know-how of the insurance market. The possible limitation of this expertise when legislation has been introduced could be problematic.35 The bare approach to claims is a possible alternative to the much-criticised British approach.136 A particular subject, it seems, concerns the arbitration procedure and the appointment of arbitrators. Therefore, the bare approach that offers the possibility of taking legal action could be a solution.
While this would be costly and obsolete if legal action were more likely, the use of a mandatory conference mechanism to resolve disputes before they are brought to justice may indeed limit this. Again, the establishment of another claim mechanism would constitute a significant revision of the mib. This could represent a higher cost potential and therefore probably unpopular with the insurance industry and motorists, as the costs are passed on to insurance premiums.